same time as nursing is glorified within our social imaginary, real mothers are supposed to obey fairly restrictive codes concerning where, how, when, and in front of whom they breastfeed" (196) .
While critiquing the loss of boundaries of the self that women experience through fetishization of their pregnant and lactating bodies, Kukla acknowledges that "the Fetish Mother and the Unruly Mother exist side by side and complement and constitute one another" (173). This is hardly different from the experience of most of us, whether mothers or not, who belong in neither category because we live our lives in the space between the limitations we recognize in ourselves and an ideal we keep trying to reach. This stretching toward an ideal from the experience of limitation is a reality that exclusive emphasis on the "maternal bodies" of pregnant or lactating women fails to capture.
Kukla deliberately avoids discussion of the theoretical or practical import of the abortion option as a means by which pregnant women can deny or end the supposedly inseparable union between them and their fetuses that the image of the fetish mother entails. Neither does she consider how images of fetish and unruly mothers affect women's experiences of labor and childbirth, or for that matter, mothering beyond those early years. But her book is packed with material drawn from the history of medicine as well as popular and professional sources that support her overall thesis, which is easily applicable to those practices also. Accordingly, feminist philosophers who wish to analyze issues involving women across the entire spectrum of mothering experiences are likely to find Mass Hysteria a rich resource from which to pursue their work. 1 Those interested in evolutionary biology, philosophy of science, and feminism will find the book an interesting, if perhaps occasionally frustrating, read. Although at times Lloyd's clear and detached account is somewhat dry, it seems strategic in the field of evolutionary biology where feminist scholarship is sometimes greeted with suspicion and contempt (witness David Barash's extraordinarily vicious review of the book [2005] 2 ). Lloyd offers a rigorous case study showing how political and methodological biases have distorted the practice and results of evolutionary investigations of female orgasm. Androcentrism and adaptationism bear the brunt of her attack, though heterosexism and the assumption of human uniqueness also play a role, albeit marginal. Though focused on critique, her argument is by no means wholly negative; Lloyd defends Donald Symons's evolutionary by-product account of female orgasm (1979) , and suggests that negative biases can be avoided by employing Helen Longino's standards for how scientific communities can support objective inquiry (1993, 2002) . Feminist scholars will find the book useful as a clear and persuasive contemporary case study in which androcentric bias has produced bad science, but beyond this point, the book's contribution is more ambiguous. From a feminist perspective, Lloyd leaves undeveloped some of the most interesting issues, including the social significance of the science of orgasm, the adequacy and limitation of sexology data in the description of orgasm, and the role of feminist approaches to science beyond merely controlling for sexist bias, in other words, beyond naïve feminist empiricism.
Being a case study, the book is rather thin on philosophy, which is relegated to the first and last chapters. The first chapter introduces important conceptual tools and the standards of evidence used in evolutionary explanations, which Lloyd carefully employs in later chapters. The majority of the book exhaustively reports the sexological data concerning female orgasm and its association with reproductive fitness and critically examines twenty-one evolutionary theories about the function of female orgasm. Lloyd points out in her review of the sexology research that although this data is inevitably flawed-distorted by poor definitions, sampling problems, and the limitations of self-reporting-it is still the only available empirical base to which any scientific theory must be accountable. She persuasively argues that the data show a weak correlation between female orgasm and intercourse-the orgasm/intercourse discrepancyand a wide variation of orgasmic response, which prima facie suggests a lack of selection pressures shaping it. This grounds what is perhaps the most compelling feature of the book-Lloyd's demonstration that the vast majority of research into the evolution of the female orgasm simply ignores or misinterprets the data (sometimes while even citing it), thus failing the most basic scientific test of empirical adequacy.
In chapters 3, 4, and 7, Lloyd provides a forty-year overview of theories that scientists have proffered to explain the evolution of female orgasm and demonstrates how adaptationist and androcentric biases have rendered them inadequate. Chapter 3 surveys the theories that explain the evolution of female orgasm by attributing to it the function of supporting pair-bonding (in females only-males remain philanderers). Chapter 4 surveys other just-so stories (including female-centered explanations) that, while not depending on pairbonding, fall prey to much the same criticisms. Chapter 7 focuses on sperm selection accounts that contemporary evolutionary biologists currently favor.
In chapter 6, Lloyd provides a discussion of adaptationism that gives both some useful background and conceptual clarification. While the devil is in the details, roughly speaking, adaptationism is the view that natural selection determines the form and function of a biological trait; in other words, a trait exists because it has made and continues to make individuals with it more likely to survive and reproduce than those without it. Lloyd's critique of adaptationism is, however, far from a rejection of it, for she characterizes her own position as a nuanced type of adaptationism. While "conservative adaptationists" like Lloyd start investigating a trait by assuming that the trait serves an adaptive function, they actively test this hypothesis (175) and are willing to accept other evolutionary explanations if evidence supports them. This contrasts with "cavalier adaptationists," who never question the adaptationist assumption and "ardent adaptationists"-the real villains-who rule out all but adaptive accounts as acceptable explanations of the evolution of female orgasm (176, 253) . Thus a by-product account, according to ardent adaptationists, is no explanation at all. Lloyd argues that a dogmatic commitment to adaptationism has kept some biologists from applying rigorous and consistent standards of evidence to relevant data. Perhaps the most striking instance of adaptationism run amok appears in theories based on the uterine upsuck hypothesis, which Lloyd discusses in chapter 7. These theories, which postulate female sperm selection through orgasmic spasms that draw sperm into the uterus, are shown to have a woefully inadequate empirical basis. Lloyd convincingly concludes that only dogmatic commitments to adaptationism could have drawn scientists to err so egregiously.
In chapter 5, Lloyd defends Symons's by-product account. According to this view, just as males have nipples because nipples serve a function that enhances the fitness of females and both sexes share certain developmental stages in embryogenesis, so orgasm serves an evolutionary function in males that, by virtue of the constraints of embryogenesis, remains in females. In response to feminist critics, Lloyd has half-jokingly renamed it the Fantastic Bonus account, but feminist thinkers may not be persuaded by the by-product/bonus distinction.
3 After all, Symons's account is in some sense androcentric, being centered literally on male function-paradoxical in a book that is a case study of androcentric bias.
Lloyd's diagnosis of androcentric bias is that it exists in the modeling of female sexual response and orgasm on that of males. The problem is that sexological data suggest female sexual response and orgasm is radically different from that of males. This raises two interesting questions: (1) What is more androcentric: describing female sexual function by analogy with male sexual function or understanding female orgasm to be an evolutionary by-product produced by selection for male orgasm and the embryogenesis of human genitals? and (2) Does the truth of a claim mean that it cannot also be perniciously androcentric? Unfortunately, Lloyd does not adequately address either question and generally leaves the concept of 'androcentrism' underdeveloped. A chapter on the topic, a partner to that on adaptationism, situating androcentrism in the feminist discourse, would have been a welcome addition to the book.
The discussion in the eighth and final chapter, "bias," ties together loose ends, but is rather narrowly focused. Lloyd begins with a list of the assumptions that have distorted the science of female orgasm but quickly reduces these to adaptationism and, nominally, androcentrism. While she allows that these two background assumptions do not necessarily lead to bad science, her extensive analysis shows that, in the case of evolutionary accounts of female orgasm, they in fact have. Bias per se is not the problem; biases are inevitable in science. The difficulty lies in distinguishing beneficial and neutral biases from the negative ones. Lloyd follows Elizabeth Anderson (1995) , who sees negative bias as a failure to pay attention to all facts relevant to the issue under investigation-in Lloyd's case study, data from sexology and primatology (Lloyd 2005, 244-45) . On Anderson's account this is a failure of impartiality, the scientific community's failure to live up to its own standards in the assessment of evidence and background assumptions, which Helen Longino noted is required for a community to produce objective scientific inquiry (1993) . Thus Longino supplied a diagnosis of the problem and a guide to how the effects of such negative biases can be mitigated. Lloyd's application of these standards to the case of female orgasm appear to amount to little more than a call for the expulsion of ardent adaptationism. Unfortunately, she does not provide a similarly detailed analysis of androcentric bias.
Although parts of the book are somewhat technical, Lloyd carefully explains most of the crucial concepts and educated readers will find it generally accessible. Nonetheless, too quick a reading may lead one to lose sight of Lloyd's limited and careful conclusions. First, there are no normative implications tied to adaptations; just because a trait is an evolutionary by-product implies nothing about its moral, aesthetic, or political value (142). If there is a normative implication to be drawn from the by-product account, it is that discussions of orgasmic function and dysfunction are not meaningful, hence there is no right or wrong way to experience orgasm (19). Second, Lloyd's thesis concerns the function of orgasm, not the function of the clitoris, which, she concedes, is most certainly involved in the features of female arousal and sexual response, and as such is conducive to reproductive fitness (38-39, 101, 159) . The failure to appreciate this distinction is a result of the androcentrism that models female sexual function on male sexual function. Third, Lloyd explicitly addresses only adaptationist accounts that posit selection for "an increased orgasm rate with intercourse. If we consider other selective regimes, all bets are off" (133). This means that Lloyd's argument is consistent with accounts associating female orgasm with increased inclusive fitness. In light of the primatology data linking orgasmic response with same-sex female mounting behaviour (56, 67) and the role of female-female sexual behaviour in bonobo (pan paniscus) social organization (103), such accounts are prima facie plausible. Indeed, at times, Lloyd implicitly challenges evolutionary biologists to come up with such an account (147); if adaptationists' ardor outweighs their heterosexism, this offers them an alternative to the by-product account. Finally, Lloyd's support for Symons's theory is far from a glowing endorsement; she only claims that it is the best account currently available. Ever the empiricist, Lloyd demands that until an adaptationist account appears that is consistent with the best evidence available, Symons' evolutionary by-product account must be preferred.
When one reflects on the limited scope of these conclusions one may feel somewhat disappointed with how little she is saying; but to expect decisive conclusions about the evolution of female orgasm is to miss the point. Lloyd's primary intention is "to draw attention to the controversy on this topic and the fascinating elements involved in that controversy" (17). She not only succeeds admirably in this task but also provides excellent groundwork upon which philosophers and biologists can further investigate the science of the evolution of female orgasm.
Notes

